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ABSTRACT 
 
IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA 
By 
Yu-Kyeong Kim 
 
The Korean financial crisis owes largely to a corporate governance failure for large 
business groups (chaebols), where their inefficient resource allocation could not be 
checked.  Effective internal mechanisms for supervision or monitoring of 
management were virtually absent.  This paper concerns basically with the question 
of what the priorities for corporate governance are and how to improve corporate 
governance in Korea.  After briefly discussing characteristics of business groups such 
as their ownership and management, the paper reviews the past characteristics of 
corporate governance, spontaneously derived from the business group.  In order to 
devise ways to improve the current chaebol system, the strengths and weakness of 
chaebols are evaluated.  Finally, after discussing the core of corporate governance 
reform, I recommend a strategy for chaebol reform.  The central argument is that, in 
view of the weak external capital market, underdeveloped industrial development and 
unstable political situation, it would be better to resuscitate chaebols through 
improving governance structure, while addressing its weakness by radically 
strengthening internal discipline mechanism, rather than to break them up. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
It is hard to deny that Chaebol contributed to economic growth in the past growth 
phase.  Diversification led to economies of scope and other synergies between 
businesses, and overcame imperfections in factor markets.  Relations with 
government and Chaebol reduced market failures.  Weak corporate governance was 
not a serious problem, since there was no separation of ownership and management 
and therefore no principal-agency problem.  It ensured speedy decision-making. 
 
However, chaebol system encountered difficulties under a new economic 
environment.  While this system worked well in the previous decades of rapid 
economic development under the umbrella of government, its weakness began to 
outweigh its strengths in the period of market maturity, in the globalization era. 
 
In other words, investors start to resist the exclusive dominance by the controlling 
shareholder-manager. The absence of the devices to check and balance the corporate 
control is expected to bring about risks more and more.  As world capital market gets 
integrated, outside investors’ role is extended and the function of capital market to 
supervise management is more emphasized. 1 In addition, government is changed 
from a partner to a reformer with respect to Chaebols. 
                                                 
1 According to distribution of ownership of share, released by KSE (1999.4), the percentage of 
foreign investor form 18% of total share ownership in Korea, but 13.4% in Japan, 8.7% in 
Taiwan, 6.8% in U.S, 16.3%(U.K) 
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The Korean financial crisis is, to a large extent, a corporate governance failure for 
large business groups, where their over-leveraged and inefficient business expansion 
could not be checked.  Effective internal mechanisms for the supervision or 
monitoring of management were virtually absent.  As a mechanism to define 
relationship between the shareholders, directors and management of a company, 
searching for the desirable corporate governance model is a problem that confronts us.  
This paper concerns basically with the question of what the priorities for corporate 
governance are and how to improve corporate governance in Korea. 
 
Arguments over corporate governance should start from understanding the 
characteristics of business group.  It is because each country has its unique business 
group style according to its internal or external economic circumstance, and has 
developed corporate governance depending on its condition.  Korean chaebols are no 
exception. 
 
Korea’s economic growth has been driven by the rather authoritarian government 
and large business groups.   Entrepreneurs in these groups have aggressively 
exploited overseas markets for trading, while heavily investing in the local economy.  
Government guidance and intervention in the financial sector, which reduced various 
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uncertainties prevailing in the early stage of development, were fairly effective in 
mobilizing resources and allocating them for the best growth performance.  However, 
continued government intervention gave rise to moral hazards on the part of both 
chaebols and financial institutions and the highly leveraged growth of large chaebols.  
All these have been responsible for economic inefficiencies and the increased 
vulnerability of the economy. 
 
The Korean financial crisis is a corporate governance failure for large business 
groups, where their over-leveraged and inefficient business expansion could not be 
checked.  It was possible because effective internal mechanisms for the supervision or 
monitoring of management were virtually absent.  Evidences confirm the concern that 
the real corporate governance challenge is to protect outside investor such as minority 
shareholders from the expropriation of controlling owners and to discipline poor 
management. 
 
With regard to chaeol reform, some reformers stand by chaebol break-up through a 
complete separation between ownership and management.  When we consider our 
weak external capital market, underdeveloped industrial development and weak 
political situation, it would be better and feasible choice to resuscitate chaebols 
through improving governance structure, while addressing its weakness, rather than to 
break them up. 
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When it comes to improving corporate governance, it is critical to strengthen 
mechanisms for internal discipline such as minority shareholder rights and outside 
directors as a way to control lax management by manager and to protect investors.  Of 
course, there has been a kind of external control such as M&A and stock and capital 
market, as an outside discipline in developed countries.  However, in the case of 
Korea, where external capital market is underdeveloped, it is difficult to expect that 
market discipline would work properly as in other developed countries.  Capital 
market is so immature, that stock price has rarely reflected firm performance and stock 
market is likely to fluctuate by stock manipulation rather than firm’s performance.  As 
a mechanism of market discipline hardly exists, internal discipline would be better 
devices to make up demerit of corporate governance problems in Korea.  So, I discuss 
how to develop corporate governance in Korea, focused on internal discipline 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.  In section Ⅰ, as the starting point 
of our debate on corporate governance, the characteristics of business groups such as 
its ownership structure would be discussed and then, characteristics of current 
corporate governance would be analyzed.  Through observing three distinct types of 
business groups as well as corporate governance (including U.S and Germany-Japan 
and Korea), above assumption: each country’s corporate governance has evolved in the 
process of overcoming challenges that corporations face, would be evaluated.   
 
In section Ⅱ, our attention is directed to chaebol groups with the discussion of 
their strengths and weaknesses.  In order to devise ways to improve the current 
chaebol system, objective evaluation for chaebols should come first.  Based on such 
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evaluation, this section discusses what should be the priorities for chaebol governance 
reform.  In section Ⅲ, I search for strategies for corporate governance reform in 
Korea, on the basis of the priorities for reform in corporate governance discussed in the 
previous section.  After briefly evaluating recent reforms, strategies for future reforms 
will be discussed. 
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Ⅱ.  Evolution of Big business groups & Corporate governance in 
Major countries: U.S, Japan-Germany and Korea 
 
1. Characteristics of big business groups in major countries 
 
For the last several decades, the Korean government controlled the financial sector 
to channel scare resources into strategic leading sectors.  Firms, mostly belonging to 
Chaebols in these industries, were given external capital through loans from 
government-controlled financial institutions.  The corporate governance system today 
inherits its unique characteristics from growth patterns of firms during this period. 
 
Each country has its unique business group style according to its internal or 
external economic circumstance, and has developed corporate governance depending 
on its condition.  The differences in governance structure mainly come from 
ownership structure.  It means that the question of who has a right to decide and who 
is responsible for is influenced by ownership structure. 
 
Therefore, as a background to a discussion of corporate governance, I will observe 
the characteristics of big business groups, including the ownership structure.  It is 
because the characteristics of corporate governance spontaneously come from the 
characteristics of business group structure.  It will be very useful to understand why 
each country has developed different corporate governance system with different goals. 
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As each county has different history of business groups, it has developed its unique 
ownership or management structure.  Social or economic environment such as the 
degree of maturity of capital market has shaped the structure of business groups.  But 
there are a few patterns that emerge across countries such as U.S model and Japan-
Germany model.  I will compare characteristics of the Korean business groups such 
as their ownership structure and management structure to those of U.S, Japan and 
Germany. 
 
1.1. Major Characteristics 
 
Korean business groups are near to individual enterprise controlled by the 
head of chaebol or one professional manager in reality, even though affiliated-
firms are legally independent.  Despite their small ownership(less than 13%), 
a founder and her family maintain control through prevalent institutional 
ownership that constitutes a large portion of cross-holdings.2  As leading 
chaebols pursued diversification strategy, for instance one chaebol engaging in 
everything from shipbuilding industry to dairy goods processing industries, top 
10 chaebols managed at least 200 individual enterprises in 1983. 3  Late 
industrial countries like Korea have a tendency to diversify into unrelated 
production activities, because it could disperse risk and make use of insufficient 
resources. 4  According to a study of diversification in Korean business 
                                                 
2 Joh Sung-Wook (19999) Control, Ownership, and Firm Performance:the case of Korea KDI 
3 Kim Dae-Whan & Kim Gyun (1999) Reform of Korean Chaebols, Nanam 
4 Rumelt (1974) Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance. Havard University Press. 
Unrelated diversification is to diversify unpredominant or a large number of unrelated 
production lines. 
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groups in 1984,5 top 10 groups managed 213 affiliated firms and 80% of them 
are unrelated production lines.  On the contrary, only 10% of them were 
related to each other.  Japanese business groups are connected with each 
other horizontally, whereas Korean Business groups are connected vertically.  
Japanese business consolidation went forward by three forms: cross ownership 
of shares, affiliated financing from banks and exchange of human resource.  
Even though each member is legally independent, they are linked 
systematically by those forms under the large business groups.  CEO 
Committee, which consists of heads of member firms play the key role as a 
board of director.  But this committee does not have authority to control 
management in each group and there is no hierarchy among groups.  It means 
that they exist as independently as they sometimes competes each other. U.S 
business groups: conglomerates, which are consisted of unrelated multi-
products, have increased a lot since 1960s.6  They are created by M&A rather 
than self-diversification.  Conglomerates are a kind of business groups, which 
the head office control unrelated business groups, acquired by M&A.  But the 
head office is consisted of financial, legal, management affairs etc, which is not 
a work-site operation.  The size of head office is small but component firms’ 
autonomy is certified.  Head office decides allocation of resource and exit or 
entry in industry. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Jung Koo-Hyun (1987) Growth strategy and management structure in Korean corporations. 
Korean Chamber of Commerce. 
6 Kang Myeong-hun (1999) A comparative study on the Business groups: Korea, Japan and 
U.S, SIAS Publication 
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1.2. Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure of U.S and U.K is characterized by large part of 
ownership on individual stockholder and institutional investor.  As we can see 
comparisons of ownership structure in the table 1, ratio of their ownership is 
more than 80% from 1990 to 1991.  In case of U.S, the ratio of individual 
stockholder and institutional investor is respectively 53.4% and 34.3% 
(pension-24.8%, investment company-9.5%).  In case of U.K, the ratio of 
institutional investor is 59.9% (pension-30.4%, insurance company-18.4%, 
investment company-11.1%), which is higher than the ratio of individual 
stockholder (21.3%).  On the contrary, Ownership structure of Japan and 
Germany is characterized by high ratio of mutual investment among non-
financial corporations.  Mutual investment between corporations makes up 
respectively 25% (Japan) and 39% (Germany) of total ownership.  Another 
marked point is that the percentage of ownership by banks is fairly high.  The 
percentage of it amount to 25% (Japan), 8.9% (Germany) respectively.  
Because mutual investment between corporations and ownership of financial 
institutions is pretty high, business environment with relationship-based system 
is naturally produced.  In the case of underdeveloped countries like Korea, 
ownership structure is characterized by high percentage of mutual investment 
between chabol-affiliated firms and high percentage of shareholdings by 
controlling family.  Despite controlling families’ small ownership(less than 13 
percent of largest 30 chaebol’s shares on average), they in chaebol-affiliated 
firms retain control through interlocking ownership among subsidiaries.  
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According to Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), the average interlocking 
institutional ownership exceeded 33 percent in the 1990s.  Family control was 
possible for two reasons: First, most shareholders are small individual 
investors, who have not engaged in monitoring activities. About 97 percent of 
the shareholders in listed firms are small individual shareholders.  Second, 
institutional owners have not played the role of monitoring firm management.  
7  What is different is low percent of individual stockholder and institutional 
investor.  They rely on loan rather than investment from banks, because they 
don’t want to give up privileges of controlling shareholders.8 
 
<Table 1> Comparisons of Ownership Structure (1990-1991) 
 U.S U.K Japan Germany 
Financial areas 39.8 60.8 47.0 19.5 
Bank 0.3 0.9 25.2 8.9 
Insurance Co 5.2 18.4 17.3 10.6 
Pension 24.8 30.4 0.9 n.a 
Investment Co 9.5 11.1 3.6 n.a 
Non-Financial areas     
Non-financial 
Corporations 
n.a 3.6 n.a 39.2 
Household 53.5 21.3 23.1 17.8 
Government n.a 2.0 0.6 6.8 
Foreign Investor 6.7 12.3 4.2 17.7 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Proshare, Tokyo Stock Exchange,  Deusche 
Bundesbanks. n.a=Not available 
 
 
                                                 
7 Joe Sung-Wook & Ryoo Sang-Dai (2000) Evaluation of changes in the corporate 
Governance system of Korean Chaebols. KDI 
8 Kang Chul-Kyoo (1999) Competitiveness and Corporate Governance. ITBI review 
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1.3. Management 
 
Management is the highest decision-making regarding how much produce, 
where to invest and what to sell.  Decision-making authority and accountable 
to whom is influenced by a form of ownership structures.  Large business 
groups of today are generally characterized by separation of ownership and 
management in developed countries.  U.S and Japan separated ownership and 
management after the Second World War. 9  But it doesn’t mean all the 
owner-management systems were abolished. It is natural for inaugurating 
enterprise to assume the form of owner-management system.  Separation of 
ownership and management happen in the process of development in business 
groups and it is just that such a phenomenon was superior in developed 
countries.  On the contrary, in case of late-comers, which have short history of 
business groups, separation of ownership and management isn’t general 
phenomenon.  Instead of it, owner-management was superior in developed 
countries such as Korea.  But even though this is natural phenomenon, 
occurred in the process of development in business groups, we can’t say owner-
management is stable system.  As we observed comparisons of development 
process in developed countries’ business groups, it could not help adapting the 
necessity of change one day. 10 
 
 
                                                 
9 柴垣和夫, 「財閥解體と集中排除」, 『戰後改革 7』, 東京大學出版會, 1974 
10 Kim Ki-Won (1998) Sublation of Chaebol Structure and Construction of Professional 
management. SIES. 
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1. Three types of governance structure: U.S, Germany-Japan and Korea 
 
2.1. Factors shaping corporate governance  
 
As earlier stated, because each countries establish its own business model 
according to condition, the history of development in corporate governance is 
different from each other.  All the capitalistic countries have developed 
business groups by adjusting to their economic, political and social 
environment. Then, corporate governance also has been differently formed 
according to the environment.  Each country’s corporate governance has 
evolved in the process of overcoming facing challenges. 
 
Corporate governance is influenced by both internal and external factors.  
In terms of internal cause, all business groups have a property to maximize its 
interest, and to improve its efficiency by minimizing cost.  It means that 
business groups have an attribute to develop itself according to its 
characteristics of corporate groups. 
 
As I mentioned before, the differences in corporate governance mainly 
comes from unique ownership structure of business groups.  The management 
structure and decision-making process vary according to whether it is numerous 
minority shareholder-oriented ownership structure (Anglo-Saxon model) or 
large stockholder-oriented one (Late-comer model), or institutional investor-
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oriented one (Japan-Deutsch model). Those three distinct business groups lead 
to three different corporate governance systems. 
 
Corporations tend to develop their own mechanism to make up for 
demerits. Much of them come from agency problem: interest conflict between 
the principal and the agent.  The subject of principal and agency is decided by 
characteristics of capitalism.  For example, in case of U.S business model, 
based on managerial capitalism, principal is shareholder and agency is 
professional manager.  On the other hand, in case of Korea, based on 
controlling-shareholder-capitalism, principal is outside investor and agency is 
controlling shareholder-manager.11 
 
In terms of external causes, corporate governance is influenced by the 
degree of market growth.  While the country with well-developed capital 
market develops corporate governance with a goal of maximizing efficiency, 
underdeveloped country tries to develop it with a goal of continuing to exist 
and to expand size.  
 
In addition, the difference of corporate governance comes from the degree 
of outside intervention.  Even though it natural for all the countries to have 
rules and regulations, however how much government interfere in management 
matters of the corporations is influential in corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
11 Kim Kyun (2000) The end of Chaebol reform: Evaluation and Prospect. Trend and Prospect 
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If government plays a decisive role in deciding firm’s entry or exit and in 
fund distribution, secretarial office of the controlling-shareholder manager (the 
group chairman) holds a more important position than the board of director. 
 
<Table 2> Factors shaping corporate governance 
Classification Controller Remarks 
Capital Market 
M&A market, Wall 
Street Walk 
Loan Market 
Restraining influence of 
Credit 
Labor Market Employee Market 
Market 
Discipline 
(External 
Control) 
Commodity Market 
Survival test in the 
perspective of Corporate 
Governance 
Board of director 
Independence, 
Representation 
General meeting of Shareholder
Voting Right, Minority 
shareholder right 
Institutional Investor Affiliated Investment 
Organization 
Control 
(Internal 
Control) 
(CEO) (The subject of Control)
Audit 
Independence, 
Confidence 
The confines 
of internal& 
External Bondholder & Shareholder 
Strong incentive to 
control management 
Rules& 
Regulations 
Government 
Regulations related to 
Corporate governance 
Social Control Social responsibility 
Social supervision& 
Pressure on management
       Source: KDI 
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2.2. Three types of Corporate Governance  
 
I argued that all the capitalistic countries have developed business groups 
by adjusting to their economic, political and social environment. Then, 
corporate governance also has been differently formed according to 
environment.  Each country’s corporate governance has evolved in the process 
of overcoming challenges which corporations face. 
 
Corporate governance controls the competitiveness of a nation.  The 
competition in the globalization era is defined as a competition of capitalist 
system or a competition of corporate governance.  
 
In the case of U.S, ownership and management is separated and agency 
problem is eased through market discipline.  That is, managerial efficiency is 
forced upon the firm through competition in the product market, financial 
market, market for managerial resources and market for corporate control.  On 
the other hand, Japanese corporate governance is characterized by 
organizational control. Big business groups is centered on the main bank and 
tied together into long-term relationships through cross-shareholding among 
member firms.  In Germany, through the practice of proxy voting, banks 
possess the power of control over firms.  Banks participate in corporate 
control through membership. 
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2.2.1. U.S & U.K type (Market-based Model) 
 
? Meaning, Ownership Structure & Characteristics: The reason why it is 
called a market-based model is that managers are very sensitive to 
reactions of market to their management activities.  Dispersion of 
ownership is widespread and importance of institutional investor is 
increasing.  The manager sets his goal of maximizing day-to-day profit, 
because he has to report firm performance regularly and it decides whether 
he receives compensation or not.  His interest is only to find out ways to 
increase the stock value.  Added value goes up through technological 
innovation and restructuring.  One of the problems is agency problem 
between stockholders and manager. 
 
<Table 3> Distribution chart of ownership in U.S Corporations 
Institutional Investor 
Year 
 Pension 
Foreign 
Investor 
Individual 
& Non-
Profit 
institution 
Others 
1950 6.1 0.8 2.0 91.3 0.6 
1970 27.3 9.2 3.2 68.1 1.4 
1990 42.7 25.2 6.9 49.8 0.6 
1996.9 45.6 22.4 6.1 47.7 0.6 
    Source: NYSE 
 
? The goal of corporations: Primary goal is stockholder wealth 
maximization, which translates into maximizing the price of the firm’s 
common stock. 
? Main Body& Major Discipline: Numbers of minority shareholder is 
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main body.  They show satisfaction or dissatisfaction through buying or 
selling shares, rather than participate in management by exercising their 
voting power.  Though they charge professional manager with overall 
management, board of director, elected by them, monitor management.  
Major discipline is market and outside director. 
 
? Other stockholders: Contrary to shareholder, other stakeholder such as 
bank, employee, custom and related corporation is at arms’ length from 
corporate governance.  For example, in the case of bank, transaction 
between bank and corporate is made according to interest rate.  Their 
relation is not closely connected.  Evaluation of firm performance is 
made by not bank but M&A market. 
 
? Institutional Investor: In the past, they remained just ‘silent partner’ of 
manager and if they dissatisfied with firm performance, they settle 
relationship with firm by selling off shares.  However, after U.S SEC 
reduced restrictions on institutional governance in 1992, ownership is 
concentrating, and institutions are becoming more active shareholder.  
They urge manager to manage efficiently rather than just sell off shares.  
Shareholder activism spread, with astonishing dismissals of CEOs in the 
1990s.12 
 
? Devices to make up for demerit: They have developed corporate 
                                                 
12 Monks &Minnow (1995) Corporate Governance. Blackwell Business 
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governance, focused on minimizing agency problem between minority 
shareholder and manager.  NYSE asks newly listed company to keep at 
least two outside directors and to establish compulsorily compensation 
committee. 
 
2.2.2. Germany & Japan type (Relationship-based Model) 
 
? Meaning, Ownership Structure & Characteristics: Their corporate 
governance is a kind of system to respect interest of various stakeholders 
including employee.  This model is characterized by ‘contractual 
corporate governance’, because all the stakeholders are bound together 
through diversified holdings.  It promotes stable and long-term 
transactions between related corporations.  Because mutual investment 
between corporation and ownership of financial institutions is pretty high, 
business environment with relationship-based system is naturally 
produced.  Shareholders expect capital gain based upon long-term growth 
rather than dividend yield, based upon short-term managerial outcomes.  
In case of Japan, stabilizing shareholders, who are related to member firms, 
make up 60% of whole shareholders.13  In Germany, while percentage of 
cross-shareholdings is lower than Japan, holding of shares by corporations 
and banks is fairly high. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Monks &Minnow (1995) 
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<Table 4> Distribution chart of ownership in Japanese corporations 
Year
Governme
nt 
Bank 
Corporati
on 
Individual Foreigner
1990 0.6 46.9 25.2 23.1 4.2 
1992 0.6 45.7 24.3 23.9 5.5 
1994 0.7 44.6 23.8 23.5 7.4 
1995 0.6 42.8 23.6 23.6 9.4 
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange 
 
 
<Table 5> Distribution chart of ownership in German corporations 
Institutional 
Investors 
 Stabilizing Shareholder
Individual Corporates Government Foreign Investor
30 27 4 41 6 19 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1991) 
 
? The goal of corporations: To create total wealth of all the stakeholders; 
shareholder, employee, bank, institutional investor, creditors, suppliers and 
customers.  Corporate consider interest of all the stakeholders equally.  
They invest only one-third outside the company and invest rest for wealth 
of whole stakeholder. 
 
? Main Body& Major discipline: In the case of Japan, major discipline is 
main bank.  As a controlling-shareholder and creditor, bank directly 
participates in management by sending executive to board of directors.  
It is close to a supporter rather than supervisor to corporate performance.  
But it actively participates in management at a critical phase, and decides 
to liquidate or revive the company.  It also could call manager to account 
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and fire manager.  In Germany, the role of bank is similar to the role of 
Japanese bank.  It is characterized by dual board system; boards of 
managing directors (Vorstand), which is consist of management, 
supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat), which is consist of shareholder, bank 
and employee.  The co-determination system is a process in which 
employee have a right to take part in entrepreneurial planning and 
decision-making through representation on the supervisory board.  The 
boards also play a critical disciplinary role when the company gets into 
troubles.  So, we call corporate governance to be insider system, rather 
than outsider system like U.S. 
 
? Other stockholders: On the contrary to U.S, individual shareholders 
don’t participate in general meeting of stockholders in Japan. In Germany, 
most of the private investors themselves don’t vote at shareholder’s 
meeting, rather, they delegate their voting rights to their banks. 14 
 
? Institutional Investor: Institutional investor is stabilizing shareholder. 
 
? Devices to make up for demerit: They have developed corporate 
governance, focused on minimizing contract cost. 15   The problems 
introduced by firm-specific investments by various stakeholders can be 
resolved either on a contractual basis or by changing the legal structure of 
                                                 
14 Lee Young-Ki (1996) Corporate Governance of Korean Corporations in the globalization era. 
KDI 
15 Williamson (1985). The Economic Institutions of capitalism, Free press 
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control rights, or by requiring that manager and directors be accountable 
to stakeholders other than shareholders. 16 It becomes adventurous for 
shareholders, creditors, employee, managers to maintain long-term 
relationship with each other in order to extract full value their firm-
specific investments and minimize contractual costs. 
 
2.2.3. Korea type (Rent-seeking model) 17 
 
? Ownership Structure & Characteristics: As earlier stated, Korean firms 
have a highly concentrated structure of ownership and control.  With this 
concentrated control structure of business groups, they succeed in pooling 
the resources of affiliated firms, creating internal market for crucial inputs 
like financial capital and managerial skill, information.  This structure 
has been formed under underdeveloped capital market and government’ 
intervention.  Throughout government-led economic growth until 1980s, 
government intervenes in the market by instituting industrial development 
programs and allocating financial resources. In order to enjoy a privilege 
given by government, Chaebols has developed governance structure 
suitable for lobbing activities to win the government support.  
Controlling shareholder-managerialsm was more efficient for lobby.  
Because government’s intervention give chaebols chance to acquire rent, 
chaebols could not help forming rent-seeking model.  Corporate 
                                                 
16 Blair.M. (1995) Rethinking assumptions behind corporate governance.  Challenge 
17 Kang Chul-Kyoo (1999) Competitiveness and Corporate Governance. 
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governance of Chaebols is characterized by three factors; ▲Majority-
shareholders participate in management ▲Hierarchy, based on control 
pyramid system ▲Absence of internal or external discipline to control 
manager. 18   Control pyramid system means that specific controlling 
shareholder, who secures the right of management in Core Company, 
control other subsidiaries’ assets as a majority shareholder by interlocking 
ownership.  In terms of external discipline system, government has 
restrained M&A by limiting mass ownership of shares and banks haven’t 
played any role in monitoring or controlling management.  In place of 
external and internal disciplines, government has kept intervening in entry 
or exit of corporate etc, as the third discipline.  Furthermore, internal 
disciplines such as outside director, also haven’t worked.  
 
? The goal of corporations: As the consequence of an industrial policy 
geared towards obtaining scale economies, every major chaebols has 
pursued business in only the tried and proven industries.  In order to 
acquire rent from government, they compete for market share rather than 
for profits.  
 
? Main Body& Major discipline: Some core companies are usually at the 
top of the ownership pyramid of business groups, and they play a role 
similar to pure holding company.  Decision at the top tend to be made by 
owners automatically, especially strategic and financial decisions in the 
hands of single owner.  
 
? Other stockholders: Shareholder without at least five percent ownership 
                                                 
18 Hwang In-Hak, Lee In-Kwon (2000) Chaebols structure and Chaebol Policy. KERI 
 23
could not do any of the following: remove a director, file an injunction and 
derivative suit, inspect affairs and company property etc.  Banks were 
controlled by government.  The tight control of the financial sector by 
government was needed for mobilizing capital and for channeling it into 
the strategic target industries.  
 
? Institutional Investor: Institutional investor is not stabilizing shareholder 
like Japan or Germany.  Their share make up 13.6% lower than other 
countries such as U.S, Japan.  However, foreign investor’ ownership of 
share is increasing faster than others.  They ask firm to meet the needs of 
global standard. 19  
 
? Devices to make up for demerit: In the new economy environment, the 
principal-agency problem is shifting from relationship between 
government and firms to relationship between manager and other 
stakeholders.  This system needs a new mechanism of corporate 
governance to resolve conflicts of interests among various corporate 
stakeholder and minimizing agency costs.  The owner-manager practice 
is believed to have an advantage in enhancing responsible management 
and in reducing agency problem between owner and management.  
However, there exists a strong case of serious conflict or agency problem 
between controlling-shareholder and minority-shareholder.  Problem is 
                                                 
19 Lee Young-Ki & Lim Young-Jae (1999) Korea’s corporate Governance: Issues and Reforms. 
KDI 
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that Korean system doesn’t have well-functioning mechanism to moderate 
agency problems. A mechanism of market discipline such as M&A hardly 
exist.  The internal control and monitoring system is deficient. Board of 
directors isn’t independent from management and internal auditors are 
dependent on the principal owner-manager.  
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<Table 6> Comparison of Corporate Governance types 
 U.S Germany Japan Korea 
Distribution 
of ownership 
-Diffusion of 
ownership 
-Absence of 
controlling 
shareholder 
-Increasing 
institutional investor 
-Strong influence of 
bank 
-No individual majority 
shareholder 
-Mutual investment between 
member firms 
-Stable shareholder 
-Strong influence of bank 
-Majority shareholder 
-Cross ownership of share 
-Increasing importance of minority 
shareholder& institutional 
investor 
Characteristic
s of 
Ownership 
-Liquidity -Stable & long-term 
relationship 
-Stable & long-term 
relationship 
-Unstable & Short-term pattern 
Governance 
Structure 
-Strong manager, weak 
owner 
- Manager control 
-Institutional investor 
as a silent partner 
-Dual board system 
-Bank participate in 
supervisory board 
-Strong influence of 
bank 
-Mutual control between 
member firms 
-Joint ownership & dispersed 
power 
-Concentrated ownership& control 
by majority shareholder 
-Strengthened control through 
mutual investment 
Function of 
Director 
-Representative of 
minority shareholder 
can appoint director 
-Increased case, which 
dismiss manager 
-Dual board system 
-Supervisory board 
elect or dismiss and 
monitor manager 
-Weak board of director -Lack of representation 
-Insufficient function of board to 
supervise manager 
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 U.S Germany Japan Korea 
Ownership& 
management 
-Separation of 
ownership & 
management 
-Management by 
professional 
manager(CEO) 
-Separation of 
ownership & 
management 
-Co-determination by 
labor& management 
--Separation of ownership & 
management 
-Extinction of majority 
shareholder after 
dismantlement of Zaibatsu 
-No separation of ownership & 
management 
-Majority shareholder 
managerialsm 
-Family control&  ownership 
Discipline -Capital market 
(M&A, Stock price) 
-Bank control 
management by 
participating in board
-Insufficient function 
of capital market 
-Capital market in its 
infancy 
-Horizontal control between 
member firms 
-Main bank as a supervisor 
-Insufficient function of 
capital market 
-Weak function of supervision 
-Deficient role of bank 
-Insufficient function of capital 
market 
The Goal of 
management 
-Maximize interest of 
shareholder 
-Create total welfare 
of all stakeholder 
-Consider interest of all the 
stakeholder 
-Obtain scale of Economies 
Corporate& 
Bank 
-Separation of bank& 
business 
-Bank control 
business 
-Close relationship between 
bank& business 
 
Role of 
institutional 
investor 
-Begin to be involved 
in reshuffle of 
manager 
-Stabilizing 
shareholder 
-Stabilizing shareholder -No stabilizing shareholder 
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Ⅲ. Priorities for Corporate Governance Reform in Korea 
 
1. Evaluation of Cheabol structure 
 
Korean corporate governance structure is characterized by the fact that the 
controlling-shareholder has an absolute control of management, hierarchy based on 
control pyramid system, and absence of internal or external discipline to control 
manager. 
 
   To a large extent, Korea’s economic growth has been driven by the rather 
authoritarian government and large business groups called chaebols.  Entrepreneurs in 
these groups have aggressively exploited overseas markets for trading, local 
construction and more investment.  Chaebols have contributed a lot to the upgrading 
of the nation’s industrial structure.  Government guidance and intervention in the 
financial sector, which reduced various uncertainties prevailing in the early stage of 
development, were fairly effective in mobilizing resources and allocating them for the 
best growth performance. 
 
   However, continued government intervention gave rise to moral hazards on the part 
of both chaebols and financial institutions, weakening of the financial sector, and the 
highly leveraged growth of large chaebols.  All these have been responsible for 
economic inefficiencies and the increased vulnerability of the economy. 
 
 28
In order to analyze strengths and weakness of chaebols, I will follow Nam (1999) 
in categorizing behavioral characteristics into four: diversification, concentration of 
Economic power, weak governance and relation with government and other chaebols. 
20 
 
1.1. Diversification  
 
Diversification of chaebols' business portfolios has begun since the 1950s 
as they acquired privatizing public enterprises and absorbed failing firms.  In 
the 1970s, they were strongly urged to undertake capital-intensive heavy and 
chemical industry projects and to absorb failing firms with attractive incentives 
and implicit risk-sharing by the government.  Also, constrained by the small 
domestic market, and motivated by huge capital gains from real estate holdings, 
they moved constantly to newly emerging industries.  Cross-shareholding and 
an easy access to bank credit through cross-guarantees among the subsidiaries 
have facilitated the highly leveraged business diversification.  Chaebols have 
been aggressive in developing new products and markets and undertaking other 
large and risky projects.  Because government provide concessional loans and 
serve as a risk-sharing partner.  These factors have encouraged investment and 
helped the economy grow fast.  But, these factors reducing investment risk for 
chaebols have been like a double-edged sword.  There has been a tendency 
that investment risk is inadequately assessed and investment efficiency is low.  
Competition among chaebols has been targeted at maximizing their market 
                                                 
20 Nam Sang-Woo (1999) Korea’s Economic crisis and Corporate Governance. KDI School 
 29
shares rather than profit.  The practices of cross-gurantees of debt repayment 
and cross-shareholding also serve as an exit barrier for inefficient subsidiaries, 
while they lead to chain bankruptcies among constituent subsidiaries. 
 
1.2. Concentration of Economic power  
 
The largest five chaebols accounted for 27% of the total mining and 
nanufacturing shipment in 1995.  The size of chaebols may not be a source of 
concern as long as they do not impair competition.  However, many chaebol-
affiliated corporations often have a market-dominating power in their business 
lines.  Making use of this position, these firms may be involved in practices 
that constrain fair competition.  Chaebols may be also infringe on the interests 
of smaller or non-affiliated firms, whose access to the credit of banks and other 
financial institutions is limited as chaebols preempt the credit with the cross-
guarantees of debt repayment among their subsidiaries.  Concentration of 
economic power also tends to promote moral hazard on the part of chaebols.  
With all the subsidiaries linked together financially sector and the economy.  
These financial linkages and exit barriers are certainly a serious problem for the 
stability and efficiency of the economy. 
 
1.3. Weak Governance  
 
The ownership and governance structure of chaebols has the advantage of 
overcoming the typical principal-agent problem of modern enterprises.  The 
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largest shareholder has full management control.  His shareholder’s equity 
share, including those of relatives and others in special relations, is usually less 
than 10% of the total.  The pattern of corporate ownership and control has a 
serious governance problem in that the outside shareholders interests are not 
adequately protected or represented.  The chairman or owner-manager may 
seek their interests maximized.  Managerial control in chaebols is 
concentrated in the chairman, without much delegation to the managers of 
individual subsidiaries.  Proper monitoring functions expected of the board of 
directors or outside shareholders have largely been missing.  This lack of 
effective countervailing power has often led to grossly inefficient investment as 
well as abuses of conflicts of interest through various internal transactions 
among subsidiaries and other means. 
 
1.4. Relation with government and other chaebols  
 
Markets fail when information is missing or investments show economies 
of scale, externalities, interdependence among themselves.  In this case, 
contest-based competition may be a solution to the problem of coordinating 
investment decisions by the government.  Chaebols are natural partners of the 
government in this arrangement, given the associated institutional costs of 
coordination and the financial capability of the firms.  The government has 
often allocated major industrial projects among business groups on the basis of 
business-government exchange of information and coordination among 
chaebols as well as a set of explicit or implicit rewards and rules.  It tended to 
 31
create group-oriented atmosphere and encourage vigorous competition among 
business groups.  In the absence of clear rules and strong institutions for the 
administration of the contest, there are such risks as collusion, impaired 
competition and rent-seeking behavior.  Aggressive competition among 
chaebols has often been for market share and size rather than profit, which has 
been responsible for wasteful over-investment or duplicative investments. 
 
<Table 7> Positive and Negative evaluations of Chaebols 
Characteristics 
of Chaebols 
structure 
Positive Negative 
Diversification 
-Reduced investment risk 
-Economies of scope& other 
synergies 
-Overcoming imperfections 
on factor markets 
-Investment inefficiency 
-Exit barriers(cross-
subsidization) lead to 
inefficient in-group resource 
allocation 
-Financial instability 
Concentration 
of Economic 
power 
-National pride: globally 
recognized brand names 
-Fair competition impaired 
-Exit barrier (Too big to fail) 
Weak 
Governance 
-No principal-agent problem 
for controlling shareholders 
-Speedy decision-making 
-Serious governance problem 
for outside shareholders 
-Poor supervision monitoring 
lead to inefficient investment
Relations with 
government and 
other Chaebols 
-Market failures(Investment 
indivisibilities or interdependence, 
etc) reduced 
-Contest-base vigorous 
competition among Chaebols
-Competition for market 
share 
-Corruption& rent-seeking 
behavior 
Source: Nam (1999) 
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2. Priorities for corporate governance reform in Korea 
 
Some reformers insist chaebols should be dismantled through a complete 
separation between ownership and management.  While we devise ways to improve 
the current Chaebols system, we should not give up all the advantages of Chaebol 
system for the sake of international competitiveness.  We have to focus chaebols 
reform on not killing chaebols but resuscitating chaebols through improving 
governance structure.  We have to develop advantages of Chaebol to the utmost and 
make up for disadvantages. 
 
2.1. Problems of Chaebol break-up  
 
The first reason we should not break up chaebol is that we are below the 
level of developed countries, in terms of industrial development.  In the case 
of developing countries, which is characterized by family-based business 
groups, long-term investment, based on in-group shareholder ratio is still 
indispensable to economic growth.  Furthermore, when we take our weak 
external capital market into account, dismantling chaebols by removing in-
group shareholder ratio would not be a desirable choice.  Chaebol breakup 
might take away not only positive function of internal capital market, but also 
the role of long-term stabilizing shareholder.  We have to use advantages of 
internal capital market and stable long-term shareholder to the fullest.  Even 
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though Korean chaebol have a serious problem, namely that majority-
shareholder managers control the entire member firms by acquiring high in-
group shareholding ratio, we should preserve its advantages, while addressing 
its weaknesses.  If internal disciplines such as manager-monitoring system are 
established, on the contrary, in-group shareholder could contribute to growth in 
company as stable shareholders.  As a stable shareholder, main banks and 
affiliated firms in Japan or Hausbank in Germany not only enable a long-term 
investment but also play a role as both a majority-shareholder and an active 
investor to monitor inefficient management.  The key to chaebols reform is to 
lead in-group shareholder to play a role as a stable shareholder and at the same 
time, to play a role as an active investor to monitor inefficient management.   
 
Secondly, because external capital market is underdeveloped in Korea, it is 
difficult to expect that market discipline such as M&A would work properly as 
in other developed countries.  In Korea, stock market is so immature that stock 
price has rarely reflected firm performance.  Some firms made a fortune by 
clever manipulation of stock market rather than firm performance.  In 
advanced market economies, corporate ownership has been dispersed with the 
firm’s growth.  Corporate ownership has usually been dispersed as firms 
finance the necessary capital for growth through the capital market.  However, 
it will take a long time for capital market to play a proper role as an outside 
discipline in Korea.  
 
Thirdly, chaebol break-up is far from feasible in Korea.  First of all, 
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political power is not sufficiently strong to promote reform perfectly.  Even 
though the government has tried to dissolve concentration of economic power 
or improve weak governance by establishing rules and laws, it has faced 
difficulties in implementing reform.  Entrenched interests such as chaebols 
chairman or some organization which speaks for them continue to ask the 
government to relax restrictions on their activities such as mutual investment 
among the affiliates.  Little stretch of imagination is needed to suspect that 
powerful families would invest heavily out of their surplus profits to perpetuate 
the status quo.  Once grown to be powerful, large family business enterprises, 
both individually and collectively, are widely believed to have interfered in the 
political process for their interests.  They have developed a close symbiotic 
relationship with the political circle by giving huge political contributions in 
exchange for implicit promise of protection and support.  The consequence 
was delays in putting all the necessary institutions in place, which are essential 
for developing an efficient capital market and allowing the separation of 
ownership and management through more effective corporate monitoring and 
disclosure.  In essence, required institution building is likely to have been 
impeded not only by the culture deeply imbedded in these societies but also by 
the conscious efforts of the vested family interests.  Another avenue of 
political influence is the ownership of mass media by some chaebols, and the 
possibility of their manipulation of public opinions.  In order to observe how 
difficult economic reforms are realized, let us look at the change of ownership 
in 30th chaebols. 
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<Figure1> Ownership trends of the 30th largest chaebols 
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 In-group shareholding (B)+Owner(and his family) shareholding(C) 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission (2000) 
 
As we can see in above figure 1, majority shareholder’s equity through 
interlocking ownership among subsidiaries increased from 44.5% in 1998 to 
50.5% in 1999.  On the contrary to our expectation, the percentage has 
increased since 1998, when government started to make efforts to implement 
various reforms.  We can guess that they control and manage firm as before, 
without regard to corporate restructuring, promoted by government since IMF 
crisis. 
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2.2. The core of corporate governance reform  
 
2.2.1. To solve inefficient resource allocation: over-investment problem  
 
As stated earlier, competition among chaebols have been for market share 
and size rather than for profit, which has been responsible for wasteful over-
investment or duplicative investments.  It brought about inefficient 
allocation; resources are not optimally allocated within business groups.  
When we regard chaebols business groups as one entity, the group chairman 
holds the power to allocate resources through cross-holding.  A company is 
expected to decide to pay a dividend, when they do not have any investment 
opportunity to make profit more than opportunity cost.  But the head with the 
control over idle cash flows tends to reinvest within business groups rather 
than pay dividend, because his interest lies in expanding his business (empire 
building) Of course, this growth-oriented allocation style is appropriate in the 
high economic growth phase, when there are many investment opportunities to 
achieve high IRR.  At that point, interest of investors do not conflict with 
manager so much.  However, when it goes to the economic maturity phase 
from the growth phase, this system might bring about inefficiency, if there is 
no system to check the manager.  
 
   The head of Chaebol, who has a goal to maximize power over 
management and scale of his organization, supplies idle funds to member-
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firms, which have more opportunities of investment.  This deformed 
allocation customs is possible, because he controls all the firms within the 
business groups and discipline system such as bank doesn’t work.  
 
   In order to allocate resource optimally, investment funds have to be 
allocated to affiliated firms, only if they are expected to make profit.  
However, if external capital market is so undeveloped and the head, who 
controls the internal capital market, attaches great importance to growth than 
to profitability, resource allocation within internal capital market might be 
seriously distorted.  
 
   It is rare for a publicly held company to acknowledge its mistakes and 
carry out restructuring by itself. 21  Furthermore, as internal capital market 
restricts investment of idle cash flows to member-firms, internal capital market 
is likely to allocate funds more inefficiently than external capital market.  In 
the end, supervision and discipline are required, in order to solve agency 
problem between chaebol chairman and investors with investment allocation 
of idle cash flows. 
 
2.2.2. Investor protection  
 
With regard to corporate governance, there are a lot of perspectives on 
                                                 
21 Jensen, M (1993)  The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control System.  Journal of Finance 
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corporate governance such as agency perspective and stakeholder perspective 
etc. 22   According to their views, they approach corporate governance 
problem differently and suggest different solution on corporate governance.  
Traditional comparisons of corporate governance systems focus on the 
institutions financing firms rather than on the legal protection of investors.  
Bank-centered corporate governance system, such as Japan and Germany are 
compared to market-centered systems, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  Relatedly, relation-ship-based corporate governance, in 
which a main bank provides a significant share of finance and governance to 
each firm, is contrasted with market-based governance, in which finance is 
provided by large numbers of investors and in which takeovers play a key 
governance role.   
 
   These institutional distinctions have been central to the evaluation of 
alternative corporate governance regimes and to policy proposals for 
improvement.  In the 1980s, when the Japanese economy did good job, 
bank-centered governance was regarded as superior because far-sighted 
banks enable firms to focus on long-term investment decisions.  But, in the 
1990s, as the Japanese economy collapsed, evaluation was totally reversed.  
Japanese banks, instead of facilitating governance, collude with enterprise 
managers to deter external threats to their control and to collect tents on bank 
loans.23  In the recent assessments by Edwards and Fischer (1994), German 
                                                 
22 Lee Young-ki & Lim Young-jae (1999) Korea’s corporate Governance: Issues and Reforms. 
KDI 
23 Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) On the costs of a bank-centered financial system. Journal of 
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banks are likewise downgraded to ineffective providers of governance.  
Market-based systems, in contrast, rode the American stock market bubble of 
the 1990s into the stratosphere of wide support and adulation.  
 
   However, the classification of financial systems into bank and market 
centered is not fruitful.  One way to do this is by looking at the actual 
outcomes.  It is easy to classify Germany as bank-centered because its 
banks influence firms through both debt and equity holdings and its stock 
market is undeveloped.  But what about Japan, which boasts both powerful 
banks with influence over firms and a highly developed and widely-held 
equity market with thousands of listed securities.  More generally, La Porta 
et al. (1997) show that, on average, countries with bigger stock markets also 
have higher ratios of private debt to gross domestic product, contrary to the 
view that debt and equity finance are substitutes for each other.  The 
prevalent financing modes generally do not help with the classification.   
 
   Another reason that the classification of financial systems into bank and 
market centered is not fruitful is that the reliance on either the outcomes to 
classify corporate governance regimes misses the crucial importance of 
investor rights.  Investor protection problem is correlated with agency 
problem between controlling-shareholder manager and minority shareholder.  
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone (2000) 24 show that managerial agency 
                                                                                                                                               
finance 53 
24 Simon & Peter. (2000) Corporate Governance in the Asian financial crisis.  Journal of 
Financial Economics.  They attribute the Asian crisis to weakness of legal institutions for 
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problems can make countries with weak legal systems vulnerable to the 
effects of a sudden loss of investor confidence.  Countries with only weakly 
enforceable minority shareholder rights are particularly vulnerable.  If such 
a country experiences even a small loss of confidence, outside investors 
reassess the likely amount of expropriation by managers and adjust the 
amount of capital they are willing to provide.  The result can be a fall in 
asset values and a collapse of the exchange rate.  
 
   To summarize, bank-versus market centeredness is not an especially 
useful way to distinguish financial systems.  Investor rights work better to 
explain differences among countries, and in fact are often necessary for 
financial intermediaries to develop.25  Corporate governance is a set of 
mechanism through which outside investors such as shareholder and 
creditors, protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders.  Most of 
all, strong investor protection may be a particularly important manifestation 
of the greater security of property rights against political interference in some 
countries.  Empirically, strong investor protection is associated with 
                                                                                                                                               
corporate governance.  This paper presents evidence that the weakness of legal institutions 
for corporate governance had important effect on the extent of depreciations and stock market 
declines in the Asian crisis. 
25 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes(2000) Investor Protection and corporate 
Governance. Journal of Financial Economics.  All financiers depend on legal protection to 
function.  According to them, a method of financing develops when it is protected by the law 
that gives financiers the power to get their money back.  Germany and some other German 
civil law countries have developed banking systems because they have strong legal protection 
of creditors, particularly of secured creditors.  Without such rights German banks would nave 
much less power.  The United Kingdom also has a large banking and public debt sector, again 
because creditors have extensive rights, as well as a large equity market.  To sum up, all the 
outside investors, be they large or small, creditors or shareholders, need rights to get their 
money back.  Investor rights are a more primitive determinant of financial development than in 
the size of particular institutions. 
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effective corporate governance, 26 as dispersed ownership of shares, and 
efficient allocation of capital across firms.  Using investor protection as the 
starting point appears to be a more fruitful way to describe differences in 
corporate governance regimes than some of the more customary 
classifications such as bank- or market-centeredness.  
 
   Rafael & Florencio (2000) shows the benefits of reform with a goal of 
investor protection in corporate governance.  The benefits would be to 
expand financial markets, to facilitate external financing of new firms, to 
move away from concentrated ownership, to improve the efficiency of 
investment allocation, and to facilitate private restructuring of financial 
claims in a crisis. In general, expropriation is related to the agency problem 
described by Jensen and Meckling(1976), who focus on the consumption of 
perquisites by manager and other types of empire building.  It means that 
the insider use the profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather than return 
the money to the outside investor.  
 
   Like this, corporate governance means the effectiveness of mechanisms 
that minimize agency conflicts involving managers, with particular emphasis 
on the legal mechanisms that prevent the expropriation of minority 
shareholders.27  
 
                                                 
26 See Rafael La Porta (2000) 
27 Shleifer, A., Vishny,R.(1997) A survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance. 
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How well protect investor is the key point to develop corporate 
governance in Korea.  Majority shareholder managers have been in 
complete control of whole the in-group shareholders without mechanism to 
control them in Korea.  Resources are not optimally allocated within 
business groups.  In order for in-group shareholder to play a role as both an 
active investor and supervisor, finally in order to allocate resource optimally, 
what is the most desirable way to develop corporate governance?  To 
strength manager-monitoring and investor-protection functions should be the 
goal of reform in corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ⅳ. Strategy for Corporate Governance Reform in Korea 
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1. Strategy of Chaebols reform 
 
As stated above, the core of reform in corporate governance lies in solving 
inefficient allocation by strengthening manager-monitoring and investor-protection 
functions.  The Korean financial crisis owed to a large extent to a corporate 
governance failure in large business groups, where their over-leveraged and inefficient 
business expansion could not be checked.  The key of chaebols reform is to lead in-
group shareholder to play a role as a stable shareholder and at the same time, to play a 
role as an active investor to monitor inefficient management by strengthening 
manager-monitoring system and investor protection. 
 
Then, what kinds of policy and institutional measure are necessary in order to 
achieve these goals, namely, to solve agency problem between majority shareholder 
and investor?  With regard to agency problem, the current Korean government has 
improved internal corporate governance by strengthening the right of shareholders and 
the accountability of controlling-shareholder. 
 
Strengthening shareholder rights: 
 
The minimum shareholder requirement to exercise shareholder’s right such as the 
right to file derivative suits, to dismissal of directors and internal monitors, to review 
accounting book, to call for a general shareholder meeting have been reduced. (See 
Table 8) For example, any shareholder with 0.01 percent of firm ownership can file a 
mismanagement derivative suit.  Despite the lower threshold, monitoring by 
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individual small shareholders remains costly.  Unlike the previous system, through 
which the entire board was chosen by a simple majority of shares, a cumulative system 
allows greater representation of minority shareholders on the board.  Hoping that 
outside directors will supervise firm management more critically, the government 
requires that at least 50 percent of board members be outside directors and extended 
the requirement to privately held financial institutions.  It also requires that outside 
directors compose at least 25percent of the board of directors of publicly traded firms.  
With regard to institutional investors, their role is enhanced.  Shadow voting is 
abolished and ceiling on bank’s equity investment in individual corporations is 
increased from 10% to 15%. 
 
<Table 8> Minimum required equity shares for the exercise of rights (%) 
 Commercial Code1 Securities and Exchange Act2 
Petition for dismissal of a director/auditor 3(5) 0.5 (0.25) 
Petition for injunction of director’s illegal 
acts 1(5) 0.5(0.25) 
Derivative suits 1(5) 0.01 
Proposal of agenda for a shareholders’ 
meeting 3(-) 1(0.5) 
Request for convening a shareholders’ 
meeting 3(5) 3(1.5) 
Right to inspect account books 3(5) 1(0.5) 
Right to corporate affairs and property 3(5) 3(1.5) 
Petition for dismissal of liquidator 3(5) 0.5(0.25) 
Notes: 1 In the parentheses are rules before the revision in December, 1998. 
          2 In the parentheses are for corporations with paid-in capital over  
100billion won.  Source: Nam et al. (1999) 
 
 
Enhancing management accountability: 
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The legal liabilities of major shareholders involved in management were 
strengthened to raise accountabilities in 1998. The government strengthened the 
responsibilities of each firm’s board of directors while requiring controlling 
shareholders to be treated of 752 listed firms had assigned 764 outside directors as of 
October 1998. 
 
1.1. Evaluation of recent reforms  
 
1.1.1. Weak shareholders’ right 
 
Almost all the relevant articles in the laws pertaining to corporate 
governance do not sufficiently protect shareholder’s rights.  There still 
remain much limitations in the legal protection of shareholders rights.  In the 
case of derivative suits, which are suits by shareholders launched against 
executives who cause damage to company property, 0.01% of equity shares are 
required for the exercise of rights by law.  However, this minimum requisite 
is so high that it is difficult to bring an action.  In fact, as a result, such 
derivative suits have been rare.  The class action lawsuit, which is a suit by 
shareholders launched against company which caused damage to shareholder 
value, has not yet been established, even though a debate over the need for 
class action suit started more than ten years ago.  The securities class action 
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lawsuit also has not yet been introduced.28  According to KSE and FSS, 
unfair transactions, which may be subject to securities class action lawsuit, are 
increasing year by year.   Also, since their size is becoming larger, investors 
are suffering financial losses. 
 
<Table 9> Unfair transaction regarding securities 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Stock manipulation 37 34 21 77 
The number of usage of 
closed information 
18 35 72 71 
Investors 1,465 1,329 1,915 2,951 
Average trade amount 
per a day (billion won) 
4,868 5,558 6,604 34,816 
Source: KSE (2000) 
 
Even though the problem of infringement on investors’ right is extremely 
serious now, a section of government and business circles are trying to reduce 
the scope for application of securities class action lawsuit.  For example, they 
are promoting the bill to limit its scope for application only to large business 
groups with assets worth two trillion won or more.  But, in reality, among 
companies involved in stock manipulation from 1998 to Aug 2001, 
corporations with assets worth two trillions won or more are merely 2.2% and 
the rest is company with assets worth less than two trillions.29  In addition, 
among companies indicated by FSS, regarding window dressing etc, 
corporations with two trillions won are merely 8.7% and the rest is company 
                                                 
28 The securities class action lawsuit is now supposed to be introduced on the regular section 
of the National assembly 2001. 
29 SPPO, FSS. 
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with assets less than two trillions from 1998 to Aug 2001.  It means that the 
restrictive bill promoted by government and business circle is highly unlikely 
to be effective. 
 
1.1.2. Lack of independent outside director 
 
With regard to outside directors, government required that at least 1/2 of the 
directors be outside directors for large listed corporations since 2001. However, 
their role has still many limitations: vague selection procedures and no special 
tasks or little information sharing etc.  In order to enable selecting of outside 
directors who represent minority shareholders and is independent from owner-
manager, cumulative voting is recognized (for shareholders holding more than 
3%) for the selection of board members.  However, it is banned at more than 
70% of listed companies in reality.30  It is because corporations could exclude 
it according to their own articles of association.  In order to enforce 
cumulative voting, corporations should not be allowed to exclude cumulative 
voting. 
 
1.1.3. Absence of management accountability 
 
When it comes to how much management accountability has been 
improved, we are able to observe the degree of improvement by looking over 
the frequency of unfair transactions among affiliates of a group.  It is because 
                                                 
30 Nam (1999) 
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the case of unfair management would be reduced, if there was better internal 
discipline to monitor and supervise management.  As I stated above, the case 
of unfair transaction such as stock manipulation with regard to stock price 
management is increasing.  Most of these cases indicted by the Prosecution 
are stock manipulation and usage of insider information by manager etc. 
 
<Table 10> Types of case unfair transaction indicted by the prosecution 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Componen
t Ratio 
Stock 
manipulation  
9 5 11 6 31 24.9% 
Usage of insider 
information 
1 6 20 1 28 22.2% 
5% Rule violation 4 5 18 0 27 21.3% 
The executives do 
not report existing 
state of share 
holding 
0 4 13 0 17 13.3% 
Short-term 
trading profit 
1 2 10 0 13 10.2% 
Others 1 3 8 0 12 9.9% 
Total 16 25 80 7 128 100% 
Source: Recited Lee Young-kyeo& Jeong Seung-chang (2000) Actual condition 
of stock management and unfair transaction in listed companies. IKSA 
 
In addition, absence of management accountability is shown by the fact, 
majority shareholder’s equity through interlocking ownership has increased 
from 44.5% in 1998 to 50.5% in 1999, regardless of reform.  Owner-manager 
still control and manage firm as before. 
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1.2. Priorities for future reforms  
 
As the power of the chaebol head comes from complete control of in-group 
shares that are owned by other affiliates of the group, we need to establish a 
much stronger control system than now.  In order to enhance management 
accountability, class action lawsuit should be introduced as soon as possible.  
Application scope for securities class action lawsuit should not be curtailed.  
 
With regard to investor protection, it is necessary to make board of directors 
include more outside directors, who substantially speak for minority 
shareholder and investors.  Without exception, cumulative voting should be 
applied to all the companies compulsorily.  In addition, minimum required 
equity shares for the exercise of minority shareholder rights such as derivative 
suits have to be lower than now.  Then, original function of general 
shareholders’ meeting and board of directors would be recovered. 
 
However, even these legal measures may not be sufficient to provide 
investor protection if the chaebol head exercise complete control of 
management by controlling the in-group shares.  Since the in-group shares 
represent fictitious capital created on the basis of the assets of the entire 
shareholders, it is unfair and inefficient to allow the chaebol head to exercise 
control over them.  Therefore, outside directors rather than chaebol head 
should be given the right to control in-group shares.  Also, in order to prevent 
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the head’s indiscreet management such as inefficient resource allocation, 
exercising votes about large investments should require outside directors’ 
approval.  These measures can put corporate governance right from the root.  
 
To summarize, in the area of corporate governance, much effort has to been 
directed toward protecting minority shareholders and disciplining poor 
management.  It includes reshaping of the board of directors, making basic 
shareholder rights easier to exercise, and exposing management control 
challengeable in the market. Though it would take some time, they would go a 
long way toward restraining controlling shareholders from expropriating 
outside shareholders and, thus, reducing the private gains expected from 
management control. 
 
2. How to promote reform 
 
I discussed policy proposals for reform above.  But it is also important to how to 
implement reform properly.  When we look back upon our past, the biggest obstacle 
to reforms is resistance from vested people.  Because we have lots of obstacle to carry 
out reform in Korea, we have take methodology into account. 
 
When we look at our situation, we easily find that the political opposition to such 
change has proved intense.  Governments are reluctant to introduce laws that are 
expected to surrender to the financiers the regulatory control they currently have over 
large corporations. As I analyzed factors, influenced on corporate governance, 
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government is the more significant factor to decide corporate governance in Korea, 
rather than external or internal disciplines.  Political situation influences significantly 
on the degree of development and direction of the reform.  Another objection to 
reform comes from the entrenched economic interests such as the head of chaebol.  In 
Korea, their power of influence is as impregnable as politician and government.  
Insiders oppose corporate governance reform and the expansion of capital markets.  It 
is because existing large firms finance their own investment projects internally or 
through captive or closely connected banks.31  Poor corporate governance delivers the 
insiders secure finance, secure politics and secure markets.  In short, they have an 
interest in keeping the system as is. 
 
When we consider this special condition in Korea, in order to achieve reforms, the 
regulatory mechanisms of enforcing shareholders and creditor rights need to be 
radically improved with the reform of legal system.  In an interview with Professor, 
Jang Ha-Sung at Korea University professor, he also is concerned about this problem. 
“I criticized the MDP as not being real reformists, but the GNP opposes reform.  
The Korean economy is at a critical turning point.  If Korea wants to stay as it is 
today, we need no further reform, but if we want to advance…. I would like to see 
some clear vision in the presidential election, but I have not heard any significant 
words (On transparency and accountability in corporate governance) from any 
candidates.  I am very concerned. We are heading into uncertainty.” 
 
Then, what can be done to achieve the goal of reform?  To organize discussion, I 
                                                 
31 Mayer (1988) New issues in Corporate Finance. European Economic Review 
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follow Coffee (1999) and Gilson (2000) in drawing a distinction between legal and 
functional convergence.32  Legal convergence refers to the changes in rules and 
enforcement mechanisms toward some successful standards. To converge to effective 
investor protection in this way, we require extensive legal, regulatory reform such as 
securities and company law etc.  We need radical changes in the legal system in order 
to improve investor protection.  There may be significant complementarities between 
various laws in protecting minority shareholders:  For example, securities law can 
mandate disclosure of material information while company laws enable minority 
shareholders to act on it.  To establish legal protection of investors is realistic 
alternatives in Korea. 
 
Marginal reform may not successfully achieve the reformer’s goals.  In part, the 
existing corporate governance arrangements benefit both the politicians and the 
entrenched economic interests, including the families that manage the largest firms in 
Korea.  Corporate governance reform must circumvent the opposition by these 
interests.  Reform of investor protection is politically feasible in some circumstances, 
and can bring significant benefits: to expand financial markets, to facilitate external 
financing of new firms, to move away from concentrated ownership, to improve the 
efficiency of investment allocation, and to facilitate private restructuring of financial 
claims in a crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Coffee,J., (1999) The Future as history: the prospects for global convergence in corporate 
governance and its implications. Northwestern Law Review.  Gilson,R.,(2000) Globalizing 
corporate governance:convergence of reform or function. Stanford University, Stanford,CA. 
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Ⅴ. Conclusion 
 
The discussions on corporate governance, have intensified since the IMF crisis, and 
took on the flavor of reforming the global financial architecture.  Transaction Cost 
Economist began to handle corporate governance.  They said that the competitiveness 
of firms is directly affected by governance structure of corporate.33  While corporate 
structure is closely related to transaction cost, it is important to find out desirable 
governance structure to be able to minimize transaction costs. 
 
Since the IMF crisis, Korean enterprises have faced changes, namely the so-called 
globalization: deepening integration to the world market for both products and 
productive factors, particularly, external liberalization of capital transactions.  As 
world capital market gets integrated, outside investors’ role is extended and the 
function of capital market to supervise management is more emphasized.  In addition, 
investors start to resist the exclusive dominance by the controlling shareholder-
manager.  The absence of the devices to check and balance the corporate control is 
expected to bring about more and more risks.  In addition, government is changed 
from a partner to a reformer with respect to Chaebols. 
  
While globalization has brought new opportunities, the economies have also been 
under increasing competitive pressure.  The implications were the needs to improve 
fragile corporate governance, which had been seriously neglected.  Big business 
                                                 
33 Williamson (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press 
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could no longer rely on corruptive symbiosis with the government that effectively 
protected the interests of controlling families from being challenged.  Big business 
should pay more attention to minority shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
The Korean financial crisis is, to a large extent, a corporate governance failure for 
large business groups, where their over-leveraged and inefficient business expansion 
could not be checked.  Effective internal mechanisms for the supervision or 
monitoring of management were virtually absent.  These groups pursue the goal of 
long-run wealth maximization of the controlling families.  This goal would generally 
deviate from the profit maximization of a business group or its member subsidiaries.  
It is so because the interests of controlling families can be furthered at the expense of 
outside shareholders mainly through the internal transactions among subsidiaries.  If 
the deviation is substantial, efficiency in group-wide resource allocation will be 
compromised.  The discussions seem to confirm the concern that the real corporate 
governance challenge is the agency problem of how to protect outside shareholder 
from the expropriation of controlling owners.  The expropriation is not just a 
distribution problem between controlling and outside shareholders, since much of the 
distorted resource allocation is occurring before corporate profits are determined.  It 
is necessary to put basic corporate governance mechanisms in place and ensure their 
effectiveness. 
 
The biggest problem of chaebols is that resources are not optimally allocated 
within business groups.  This deformed allocation customs is possible, because 
chaebol manager controls all the firms within the business groups and discipline 
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system such as bank doesn’t work.   It is possible because controlling-shareholder 
manager exercise despotic management and control through interlocking ownership 
between subsidiaries.  Overlapping investment, which is pointed out an internal cause 
of IMF crisis, was possible by that despotism.  To make matter worse, absence of 
internal discipline such as board of directors, and external discipline such as bank 
brought about chaebols’ overlapping investment. 
 
When we debate chaebol problem, some reformers insist it should be dismantled 
through a complete separation between ownership and management.  However, we 
had better devise ways to improve the current Chaebols system than give up all the 
advantages of Chaebol system.  We have to focus chaebols reform on not killing 
chaebols but resuscitating chaebols through improving governance structure.  We 
have to develop advantages of Chaebol to the utmost and make up for disadvantages. 
 
There is several reason chaebol break-up is unrealistic alternative: First of all, in the 
case of developing countries, which is characterized by family-base business groups, 
long-term investment, based on in-group shareholder ratio is still indispensable to 
economic growth. We have to use advantages of internal capital market and stable 
long-term shareholder to the full.  Even though Korean chaebol have a serious 
problem, which majority-shareholder managers control whole the member firms by 
acquiring high in-group shareholding ratio, we should make use of its advantage, by 
taking away its weakness.  Secondly, external capital market is so undeveloped in 
Korea; it is so difficult to expect that market discipline such as M&A would work 
properly like other developed countries. Break-up is far from reality in Korea.  The 
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insistence to dismantle chaebols by removing in-group shareholder ratio isn’t desirable 
choice, when we take our weak external capital market into account.  We have to use 
advantages of internal capital market and stable long-term shareholder to the full.  If 
internal disciplines such as manager-monitoring system are established, on the contrary, 
in-group shareholder could contribute to growth in company as stable shareholders.  
Lastly, political power is not enough strong to promote reform perfectly. Even though 
government tried to dissolve concentration of economic power or improve weak 
governance by establishing rules and laws, they have faced difficulties to implement 
reform. They must have developed a close symbiotic relationship with the political 
circle by giving huge political contributions in exchange for implicit promise of 
protection and support.  The consequence was delays in putting all the necessary 
institutions in place, which are essential for developing an efficient capital market and 
allowing the separation of ownership and management through more effective 
corporate monitoring and disclosure. 
 
With regard to reform in corporate governance, efficient resource allocation and 
investor protection should be two major cores of reform in corporate governance.  
The Korean financial crisis is, to a large extent, a corporate governance failure for large 
business groups, where their over-leveraged and inefficient business expansion could 
not be checked.  Competitions among chaebols have been for market share and size 
rather than profit, which has been responsible for wasteful over-investment or 
duplicative investments.  It brought about inefficient allocation; resources are not 
optimally allocated within business groups.  The head of Chaebol, who has a goal to 
maximize power over management and scale of his organization, supplies idle funds to 
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member-firms, which have more opportunities of investment.  This deformed 
allocation customs is possible, because he controls all the firms within the business 
groups and discipline system such as bank doesn’t work. The problem has been most 
serious in family-controlled and extensively diversified business groups.  In the end, 
supervision and discipline are required, in order to solve agency problem between 
chaebol chairman and investors with investment allocation of idle cash flows.  In 
order for in-group shareholder to play a role as both an active investor and supervisor, 
finally in order to allocate resource optimally, what is the most desirable way to 
develop corporate governance?  To strength manager-monitoring and investor-
protection functions should be the goal of reform in corporate governance. 
 
Government reform efforts have often gone beyond instituting proper governance 
mechanisms to interfere in the organizational structure of business groups or impose 
certain rules geared to protecting minority shareholders.  Even though the current 
Korean government has improved internal corporate governance by strengthening the 
right of shareholders and the responsibility of controlling-shareholder, much effort has 
to been directed toward protecting minority shareholders and disciplining poor 
management. 
 
In order to enhance management accountability, class action lawsuit should be 
introduced as soon as possible.  Application scope of securities class action lawsuit 
should not be curtailed.  With regard to investor protection, it is necessary to make 
board of directors include more outside directors, who substantially speak for minority 
shareholder and investors.  Without exception, cumulative voting should be applied to 
 58
all the companies compulsorily. 
 
However, even these legal measures may not be sufficient to provide investor 
protection if the chaebol head exercise complete control of management by controlling 
the in-group shares.  Since the in-group shares represent fictitious capital created on 
the basis of the assets of the entire shareholders, it is unfair and inefficient to allow the 
chaebol head to exercise control over them.  Therefore, outside directors rather than 
chaebol head should be given the right to control in-group shares.  Also, in order to 
prevent the head’s indiscreet management such as inefficient resource allocation, 
exercising votes about large investments should require outside directors’ approval.  
These measures can put corporate governance right from the root. 
 
Though some of these measures might be delayed by entrenched interests, the 
integration of capital markets and extended role of outside investor makes such 
reforms more likely today than they have been in last decades. 
 
 
-The end- 
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